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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article deals with the regulation of discharges of waste in storm
water from municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s).1 In the last
few years, significant regulatory action has occurred in this area,
especially in California. The permitting of MS4s has generated political
controversy in the regulated community, which has bubbled over into
legal challenges.2
Although some legal questions have been settled by the courts, the
1. An MS4 is defined broadly by the federal regulations as “a conveyance or
system of conveyances (including roads with drainage systems, municipal streets, catch
basins, curbs, gutters, ditches, manmade channels, or storm drains)” owned or operated
by a state, city, town, or other public body having jurisdiction over the disposal of storm
water. Storm Water Discharges, 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) (2002). Note that this
definition of an MS4 is not limited to municipally owned storm sewer systems.
Municipal storm water federal regulations are being implemented in two phases,
depending on the classification of the municipality as “large,” “medium,” or “small.”
The phase I regulations apply to large communities with populations of 250,000 or more
and medium communities with populations of 100,000 or more people. 40 C.F.R. §
122.26(b)(4), (b)(7). These regulations were issued by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) on November 16, 1990. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg.
47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122–24). The EPA subsequently
issued amended regulations on March 21, 1991. National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges;
Application Deadline for Group Applications, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,098 (Mar. 21, 1991) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). The phase II regulations were published as final rules
on December 8, 1999 and became effective on February 7, 2000. National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control
Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–24). They cover “regulated small” MS4s located in
smaller urbanized areas that are not regulated by phase I, including military bases. 40
C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(16). Phase II regulation covers more than municipal systems. Storm
water systems on military bases, large hospitals, prison complexes, school districts,
colleges, highways, and other thoroughfares are also covered. Id. Operators of
“regulated small” MS4s are required to obtain permit coverage by March 10, 2003.
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the
Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. at
68,722. This two-phased approach allows permitting authorities to initially focus on
those municipalities with the most serious storm water problems. See Envtl. Def. Ctr. v.
EPA, No. 00-70014, 2003 WL 113486 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2003) (generally affirming the
phase II rules against statutory, administrative, and constitutional challenges, but
remanding to correct procedural defects in the general permit program).
2. Although the focus of this Article is on California law, storm water legal
challenges are occurring outside California. See, e.g., Judgment of Dismissal, Tualatin
Riverkeepers v. Browner (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-793 BR), noted in Alexandra Dapolito
Dunn, Municipal Storm Water Permits—Why Numeric Limits Don’t Fit, WATER
QUALITY & WETLANDS COMMITTEE NEWSL., Dec. 2001, at 4, 5; Miss. River Revival, Inc.
v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, No. C1-01-23, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 855 (Minn.
Ct. App. July 31, 2001); City of Irving, Texas, Mun. Separate Storm Sewer Sys., No. 0018 (E.A.B., July 16, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/disk11/irving.pdf (last
visited Jan. 1, 2003).
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situation is dynamic. At the federal level there have been two notable
storm water decisions, Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner and
Environmental Defense Center v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.3 There have been two administrative decisions issued by the
State Water Resources Control Board.4 Petitions to the State Water
Resources Control Board challenging the Los Angeles, Orange County,
and Santa Ana storm water permits have been filed and are pending
resolution.5 In late 2001, a lawsuit was filed by the Building Industry
Association challenging the San Diego MS4 permit6 and requesting a writ
of mandate to set it aside. In mid-2002, the California Court of Appeal for
the Sixth District decided Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of
Salinas,7 in which the city’s storm drainage fee was held invalid for failing
to comply with the voter approval requirements of proposition 218.
Additional administrative and judicial legal challenges to these and other
storm water permits are likely in the future.
3. Defenders of Wildlife, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that municipal
storm-sewer discharge permits are not required to comply with state water-quality
standards, but the EPA has discretion to impose such standards); Envtl. Def. Ctr., 2003
WL 113486.
4. In re Cities of Bellflower, SWRCB Order WQ 2000-11, 2000 WL 33158724
(Oct. 5, 2000); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County & W. States Petroleum Ass’n,
SWRCB Order 2001-15 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/w
qorders/2001/wqo/wqo2001-15.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2003).
5. See, e.g., Petition of County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Flood
Control Discharge, Los Angeles Region, Jan. 11, 2003, SWRCB/OCC File No. A-1448
(on file with author); Petition of Los Angeles County Economic Development
Corporation, City of Lake Forest, City of Los Alamitos, City of Stanton, Santa Ana
Region, Jan. 18, 2002, SWRCB/OCC File No. A-1463(a) (on file with author); Petition
of Mission Viejo, San Diego Region, Feb. 13, 2002, SWRCB/OCC File No. A-1465(c)
(on file with author).
6. State Respondents’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Complaint/Petition for Writ of Mandate, Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County v.
State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal. Super. Ct. 2003) (No. GIC 780263). The San Diego
storm water permit is “area-wide.” It applies to the following cities: Carlsbad, Chula
Vista, Coronado, Del Mar, El Cajon, Encinitas, Escondido, Imperial Beach, La Mesa,
Lemon Grove, National City, Oceanside, Poway, San Diego, San Marcos, Santee, Solana
Beach, and Vista. It also includes the County of San Diego and the San Diego Unified
Port District. California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Waste Discharge
Requirements for Discharges of Urban Runoff from the Municipal Separate Storm Sewer
Systems (MS4s) Draining the Watersheds of the County of San Diego, the Incorporated
Cities of San Diego, and the San Diego Port District, Order No. 2001-01, at 1 (Feb. 21,
2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/programs/sd_stormwater.html
[hereinafter Order No. 2001-01].
7. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), review denied, 2002 Cal. LEXIS
5938 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002).
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Predictably, public policy decisionmakers and attorneys practicing
environmental and land use law will be swept up in the controversy
surrounding the subject of municipal storm water regulation. The stakes
are high. The goal of this Article is to provide a framework for
understanding some of the emerging legal issues.
II. THE FEDERAL-STATE STRUCTURE
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, more commonly referred to
as the Clean Water Act (CWA), is based on Congress’s authority under
the Commerce Clause “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”8 It is premised on the
realization that the protection of aquatic resources necessitated broad
authority to control water pollution and that the discharge of pollutants
be controlled at the source.9
The CWA generally uses two different regulatory approaches or
philosophies to control water pollution. The predominant regulatory
strategy is based on controlling the discharge of pollutants through the
use of effluent limits, which are set in uniform, technology-based
terms.10 Dischargers are legally authorized to release pollutants11 to
waters of the United States pursuant to the effluent limits contained in
their permit. The other approach focuses on regulating dischargers
based on their impact to the receiving water quality. Discharge limits
are set in terms of the amount of pollution allowed in a defined water
body or water body segment with consideration given to local
conditions, such as the beneficial uses of the receiving water and its
assimilative pollutant capacity.12
The starting point to understanding the storm water regulation is the
CWA. It is the principal federal statute dealing with water pollution,
including MS4 storm water permitting.13 The CWA consists of a
number of general programs, including the National Pollutant Discharge

8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
9. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742.
10. JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 608 (1999).
11. The term “pollutant” includes sewage, chemical wastes, biological
materials, heat, industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste. 33 U.S.C. § 1362
(2000). The term “pollution” is broadly defined to mean “the man-made or maninduced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of
water.” Id.
12. OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE
USER’S GUIDE 295–308 (2d ed. 2001).
13. The basic structure of the CWA was established in 1972. It has been subjected
to several significant sets of amendments since then. Important changes were made to
the CWA in 1977, 1987, and 1990. Id. at 295–96.
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Elimination System (NPDES) point source program,14 the pretreatment
program applicable to indirect dischargers,15 the nonpoint source (NPS)
program,16 the dredge and fill program,17 and the oil spill program.18
Municipal storm water regulation is part of the NPDES permit
program, although it also seeks to deal with some of the problems
common to NPS pollution. In 1987, Congress added section 402(p) to
the CWA.19 Congress directed that storm water discharges be regulated
as “point sources”20 and then established a framework for issuing
permits.21
Section 402(p)(3)(B) is the controlling federal statutory provision for
municipal storm water discharges. The statute establishes the following
federal permit requirements for municipal storm water discharges:
Permits for discharges from municipal storm sewers—
(i) may be issued on a system- or jurisdiction-wide basis;
(ii)shall include a requirement to effectively prohibit non-stormwater
discharges into the storm sewers; and
(iii)shall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the
maximum extent practicable [MEP], including management practices,
14. Clean Water Act, § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. §
1342 (2000).
15. Clean Water Act, § 307(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (2000) (pretreatment effluent
standards).
16. Clean Water Act, §§ 208, 319, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329 (area-wide waste
treatment management; NPS management programs).
17. Clean Water Act, § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (dredge and fill).
18. Clean Water Act, § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000) (oil spill program).
19. Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 405, 101 Stat. 7, 69–71 (1987). See also National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm
Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,991–92 (Nov. 16, 1990) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 122–24). Section 402(p) requires permits to be obtained for the following
types of storm water discharges: those associated with industrial activities, those from
municipal storm sewer systems serving populations over 100,000, discharges with
respect to which a permit had been issued prior to 1987, and any discharge determined
by the permitting authority to be contributing to a violation of water quality standards or
a significant source of pollutants to waters of the United States. National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water
Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. at 47,992.
20. The CWA defines a point source as “any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance,” including such physical structures as pipes or ditches. Clean Water Act, §
502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000).
21. The CWA also regulates industrial storm water discharges under the NPDES
program. See Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A). Federal regulations
identify eleven categories of industry that are covered, including construction activities
where the construction disturbs five acres or more. See Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the EPA’s decision to regulate
construction sites only over five acres is arbitrary and capricious).
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control techniques and system, design and engineering methods, and such
other provisions as the Administrator or the State determines appropriate for
the control of such pollutants.22

Since 1987, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
promulgated regulations governing storm water discharges. They are
contained primarily in 40 C.F.R. § 122.26,23 with additional references
in Parts 122, 123, and 124. As would be expected, these regulations add
considerable implementing detail to the statutory mandate found in
section 402(p).
Although MS4 permits are NPDES permits, they differ considerably
from the technology-based treatment standards and numeric effluent
criteria associated with “end-of-pipe” discharges.24 The rationale for
treating storm water discharges differently from traditional end-of-pipe
discharges is based on the variability of storm water discharge. Storm
water is highly variable, both as to flow and as to pollutant type and
concentration. The MEP standard was created by Congress to allow
permits to be tailored to the specific nature of MS4 discharges. Included
in this grant of flexibility was the idea that the permit requirements could
be directed at sources of pollution on a system-wide basis.
Issuing permits on a system-wide basis allows municipal entities and
other political subdivisions responsible for different parts of a single
MS4 system to be co-permittees on a single permit.25 This approach is
advantageous because it facilitates coordination and consolidation of
MS4 activities and spreads the burden for monitoring, analysis, and
development and implementation amongst those parties to the permit.
The next important structural consideration to understand is the role of
the states in administering the CWA’s provisions. The EPA is
authorized by the CWA to delegate NPDES permit issuing
responsibilities to a state provided that the state has a permit program
that is substantially equivalent to the federal program.26 California has
enacted equivalency legislation authorizing it to implement and
administer the CWA.27 The authority to issue MS4 permits is exercised
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B).
23. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24. See Questions and Answers Regarding Implementation of an Interim
Permitting Approach for Water Quality-Based Effluent Limitations in Storm Water
Permits, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,425, 57,425–426 (Nov. 6, 1996).
25. See Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(i).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
27. CAL. WATER CODE § 13370(c) (West 1992).
[I]t is in the interest of the people of the state, in order to avoid direct
regulation by the federal government of persons already subject to regulation
under state law pursuant to this division, to enact this chapter in order to
authorize the state to implement the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, and federal
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by the nine California Regional Water Quality Control Boards within the
state.28 The State Regional Water Quality Control Board has administrative
review authority over the regionally issued storm water permits.29
In the early 1990s, regional boards began issuing MS4 permits based
on the provisions in the CWA. Some MS4 permits, for example those
issued by the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board to San
Diego and Orange County, “exceed” the requirements of federal law.30
As discussed in the Part below dealing with the California
Environmental Quality Act,31 this feature of going beyond the federal
requirements is legally significant.
The topic of storm water regulation has recently attracted the attention
of the California Legislature. In 1998, it added the Storm Water
Enforcement Act32 to the Water Code. In 2001, it added section 13383.5
to the Water Code requiring the State Water Resources Control Board to
develop, by January 1, 2003, minimum storm water monitoring and
regulations and guidelines issued pursuant thereto, provided, that the state
board shall request federal funding under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities under this program.
Id.; see also Storm Water Enforcement Act of 1998, CAL. WATER CODE § 13399.43
(West Supp. 2003) (“For purposes of this chapter, ‘NPDES permit’ means a permit
issued under the national pollutant discharge elimination system program in accordance
with the Clean Water Act.”) (citation omitted).
28. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13200–13228 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003); see also id. §
13160 (West 1992) (dealing with the state board’s authority to exercise any powers
delegated to California by the CWA).
29. CAL. WATER CODE § 13320 (West 1992).
30. See San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board, Comparison Between
the Requirements of Tentative Order 2001-01, the Federal NPDES Storm Water
Regulations, the Existing San Diego Municipal Storm Water Permit (Order 90-42), and
Previous Drafts of the San Diego Municipal Storm Water Permit, agenda item 5, attach.
4, at 2–3 (Dec. 13, 2000) (on file with author). The comparison states:
Approximately 60% of the requirements in Tentative Order 2001-01 are based
solely on the 1990 federal NPDES Storm Water Regulations. The remaining
40% of the requirements in the Tentative Order “exceed the federal
regulations.” Requirements that “exceed the federal regulations” are either
more numerous, more specific/detailed, or more stringent than the
requirements in the regulations.
Id. at 2. The comparison goes on to discuss the provisions that exceed the federal
regulations. “The 40% of the requirements in Tentative Order 2001-01 which ‘exceed
the federal regulations’ are based almost exclusively on (1) guidance documents
developed by the USEPA; and (2) the SWRCB’s orders describing statewide precedent
setting decisions on MS4 permits.” Id. at 2–3.
31. See discussion infra Part V.A.
32. 1998 Cal. Stat. 998 (1998) (codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13399.25–.43
(West Supp. 2003)).
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sampling requirements for specified municipalities and industries.33
As the politics of storm water regulation heat up, which they
undoubtedly will, one can confidently predict more involvement by the
legislature.
The federal-state structural relationship is fundamental to understanding
storm water regulation in California. Decisionmakers and attorneys
practicing in this area must understand both the CWA and the PorterCologne Water Quality Control Act,34 which is the water quality control
law through which California implements the CWA.
III. THE STORM WATER POLLUTION PROBLEM
The significance of the storm water problem can be easily stated: it
has been found to be the leading cause of water quality impairment in
California,35 as well as nationally. In November 2001, the State
Water Resources Control Board and Regional Water Quality Control
Boards adopted a strategic plan for the next five years. One of the
identified challenges contained in the plan is reducing storm water
pollution. The strategic plan captures the essence of the storm water
problem:
The recent repeated closures of beaches in Southern California due to
excessive bacteria levels in coastal waters has highlighted the significance of
contaminated storm water in California. During a storm, or other events
where water flows across large expanses of pavement, that water may pick up
pollutants along the way. Water that flows down driveways and streets and
into a gutter eventually makes its way into a storm drain, and then flows
directly to a lake, river or the ocean. Common pollutants that are picked up
along the way include motor oil, pesticides, brake dust, pet wastes, paint, and
household chemicals.
These pollutants can have harmful effects on drinking water supplies,
recreational use, and wildlife. The federal Clean Water Act requires that
various industrial facilities, construction sites, and urban areas with more than
100,000 people, control the amount of pollutants entering their storm drain
systems. This requirement will soon be expanded to include smaller
communities as well. Storm water pollution is an issue that touches almost
33. 2001 Cal. Stat. 492 (codified at CAL. WATER CODE § 13383.5(b) (West Supp.
2003)) (“This section only applies to regulated municipalities that were subject to a
storm water permit on or before December 31, 2001, and to regulated industries that are
subject to the General Permit for Storm Water Discharges Associated with Industrial
Activities Excluding Construction Activities.”).
34. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13200–13270 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003)). For a useful
introduction to the Porter-Cologne Act, see William R. Attwater & James Markle,
Overview of California Water Rights and Water Quality Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957, 994–
1012 (1988). The reader is cautioned, however, that changes to federal and state law
have occurred since this article was published in 1988.
35. Storm Water Enforcement Act § 1, 1998 Cal. Stat. 998 (“The Legislature
hereby finds and declares all of the following: (a) Unregulated storm water runoff is a
leading cause of contamination of the state’s surface water and groundwater.”).
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every Californian who is both part of the problem and part of the solution.
Our challenge is two-fold: to educate the general public; and to work together
with all parties to ensure compliance with pollutant discharge laws.36

The waste products in urban storm water runoff frequently contain a
toxic brew of metals, pesticides, fertilizers, animal waste, trash, and
numerous other toxic substances. This toxic brew often journeys
through a community’s storm sewer system,37 picking up additional
pollutants along the way, before being released into the community’s
receiving waters.38 These receiving waters may be coastal waters, bays,
lagoons, groundwater, or surface waters, including creeks, rivers or
streams. What is not mentioned by the strategic plan is that this
dangerous concoction usually is discharged to the receiving waters
without the benefit of any type of treatment to protect the public.
The adverse impact with this release of the waste in urban runoff has
broad environmental and economic consequences. Urban storm water
runoff may harm a community’s general hydrology system by increasing
stream bank erosion, degrading benthic habitat, poisoning sediment,
decreasing aquatic diversity, and limiting water contact recreational
opportunities, including but not limited to beach closures. Thus, it is not
surprising that the waste in contaminated urban storm water has broad
adverse effects on a community’s environment, human health and safety,39
and economy.40
36. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD & REGIONAL WATER QUALITY
CONTROL BOARDS, STRATEGIC PLAN 8 (2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stra
tegicplan/01strategic_plan.pdf. The state and regional boards completed a strategic plan
in 1995 and revised it in 1997. Id. at 4. The current strategic plan was promulgated on
November 15, 2001. Its purpose is to highlight priorities that need to be addressed
during the next five years. Id.
37. As used in this Article, the term “storm sewer system” is broadly inclusive. It
includes roads with drainage systems, municipal streets, curbs, gutters, ditches, natural
drainage features or channels, and man-made channels or storm drains. When natural
drainage features or channels, such as an urban stream, are used as part of the storm
sewer system, they are both part of the municipal conveyance system and the receiving
water.
38. As used in this Article, the term “receiving waters” also is broadly inclusive. It
includes, for example, creeks, streams, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, estuaries, bays, and the ocean.
39. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 2–3, finding 6. Urban runoff contains
pollutants, which threaten human health. Id. Human illnesses have been linked to
recreation activities in the proximity of storm drains, and pollutants from urban runoff
can affect humans by entering the food chain. Id.
40. See, e.g., Verne G. Kopytoff, Storm Drains Pose San Diego Health Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, § 5, at 3 (issuing a travel advisory due to dangerous storm water
discharges); Kemp Powers, Beaches that Make You Go Ewwwww! Don’t Go Near the
Water, FORBES, July 3, 2000, at 295 (discussing vacation beach closures due to storm
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The public is clearly concerned with water pollution. According to a
recent research study by the California Water Awareness Campaign, the
quality and quantity of water available rank as the two most important
environmental issues facing California.41 Of the ten statewide issues,
water quality and water supply ranked at the top with eighty-three
percent and eighty-two percent of the respondents rating them,
respectively, as “very important.” Although water quality and water
supply were separated for purposes of the survey, water quality and
water supply are often interdependent as a practical matter.42 The amount
of usable water for beneficial purposes is directly related to its quality.
IV. STRUCTURE AND THEORY: THE SAN DIEGO MS4 PERMIT
One administrative effect of municipal storm water permitting is to
subject many industrial and construction activities to dual, overlapping
regulation both at the state and local level. Industrial and construction
activities are regulated independently by statewide general permits,43 as
well as under local land use permitting. This system of dual oversight of
industrial and construction storm water discharges means that regulatory
enforcement actions to secure compliance may be brought either by the
water runoff contamination). There is no accurate way to assess the economic effect of
such negative press, but one can reasonably assume that it will have an adverse
economic impact on the tourist economy.
Another economic impact is on real estate values. One EPA study revealed that
property values in the area of Lake Champlain in the Northeastern United States with
good water quality were valued an average of twenty percent more than property around
poor water quality. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LIQUID
ASSETS: A SUMMERTIME PERSPECTIVE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CLEAN WATER TO THE
NATION’S ECONOMY 8 (1996).
41. THE CALIFORNIA WATER AWARENESS CAMPAIGN, PUBLIC INFORMATION AND
EDUCATION ASSESSMENT STUDY 2 (2001), available at http://www.wateraware.org/
surveyresults.html.
42. See, e.g., United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161,
166 (1986) (describing California’s water problem as “not a lack of water but uneven
distribution of water resources”).
43. In California, statewide general industrial and construction permits are adopted
by the State Water Resources Control Board. They generally prohibit the discharge of
pollutants and nonstorm water, and require the use of BMPs to reduce site runoff.
Industrial facilities subject to the CWA must either comply with the general permit or
obtain individualized NPDES permits. See State Water Res. Control Bd., Water Quality
Order No. 97-03-DWQ, Nat’l Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys. General Permit No.
CAS000001, at V (1997), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/ industrial.html.
Dischargers subject to the general permit must develop and implement an effective
Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) “to reduce or prevent pollutants
associated with industrial activity in storm water discharges and authorized non-storm
water discharges.” Id. at IX; see also State Water Res. Control Bd., Order No. 99-108DWQ, Nat’l Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys. General Permit No. CA000002
(1998), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/construction.html (statewide
general construction storm water permitting for construction activities).
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local authority or by the state.44
Municipal storm water permits vary in their technical detail.
Nevertheless, the San Diego MS4 permit is a useful vehicle to reify
some of the legal issues surrounding the topic of storm water permitting
generally. The San Diego permit is complex.45 It is fifty-two pages in
length, with another thirty or so pages of appendices. Notwithstanding
this complexity, the permit contains certain basic operating provisions,
which may be likened to the gears of a car transmission.
The operative provisions of the permit are as follows: (1) the findings
on which the permit is based,46 (2) the general prohibition provisions47
that apply unless the discharge qualifies for an exemption,48 (3) the
Model Standard Urban Storm Water Mitigation Plan (SUSMP),49 (4) the
44. See, e.g., Storm Water Discharges, 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c) (2001) (federal
regulation of storm water discharges associated with industrial and construction activity).
45. See generally Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6.
46. The standard of judicial review applicable to administrative decisions is
important to the legal analysis of a storm water permit. Review by the trial court is
governed by the California Water Code. It provides that “the court shall exercise its
independent judgment on the evidence.” CAL. WATER CODE § 13330 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2003). In exercising its judgment, the trial court must afford a strong presumption
of correctness concerning administrative findings, and the party challenging the permit
bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to
the weight of the evidence. See Fukuda v. City of Angels, 997 P.2d 693, 700 (Cal.
1999). The compatibility of the presumption of correctness with the independent
judgment standard was explained by the California Supreme Court in Fukuda.
[T]he presumption provides the trial court with a starting point for review but
it is only a presumption and may be overcome. Because the trial court
ultimately must exercise its own independent judgment, the court is free to
substitute its own findings after first giving due respect to the agency’s
findings.
Id. at 701. While the trial court is required to review the evidence supporting a storm
water permit under the independent judgment standard of review, the substantial
evidence test would apply to any appeal.
47. Discharges from the MS4 that have not been reduced to the MEP are
prohibited. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 9. Discharges are also subject to all
Water Quality Control Plan (Basin Plan) restrictions, which means that discharges from
the MS4 cannot cause or contribute to the exceedance of water quality standards. Id.
48. Certain nonstorm water discharges in identified categories may be exempted
from the general prohibition provided they are determined not to be a significant source
of pollution by the co-permittee. The identified categories which may be exempted are
based on the federal regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)(iv)(B)(1) (2001).
49. The SUSMP addresses how the co-permittees will manage urban runoff from
“new development” and “significant redevelopment,” which are terms of art defined in
the permit. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 16. It identifies minimum mandatory
best management practice (BMP), criteria for sizing BMPs, and criteria for infiltration
BMPs. Id. at 3, finding 11.
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Jurisdictional Urban Runoff Management Program (JURMP),50 (5) the
Watershed Urban Runoff Management Program (WURMP),51 and (6)
various monitoring and reporting requirements.
As previously noted, MS4 permitting is based primarily on the CWA.
It also is based on state law.52 Simply put, the San Diego MS4 permit
requires co-permittees, who authorize and realize the benefits from
urban development,53 to exercise their land use authority as it pertains to
planning, construction, and use and operation with an eye toward water
quality impacts. The permit is premised on the theory that the copermittees’ authority to regulate development carries with it the
corresponding responsibility to address water quality impacts within its
jurisdiction. It is also predicated on the notion that pollution prevention
and control by the authorizing land use entity provides the greatest and
most cost-effective opportunity to protect water quality.
V. EMERGING LEGAL CONCERNS
A. California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
Under CEQA,54 a public agency must prepare an environmental
impact report (EIR) for projects that may have a “significant
environmental effect.”55 As previously stated, the San Diego MS4
permit, as well as that issued to Orange County, exceeds the federal
regulations and is based in part on California law.56 As a result, the
Building Industry Association (BIA) has challenged the San Diego

50. The JURMP documents describe how the co-permittees will manage urban
runoff within their respective jurisdictions. Co-permittees also have the discretion to
develop a model JURMP. Id. at 13–14.
51. The WURMP operates in tandem with the JURMP. It is based on the principle
that urban runoff does not respect political boundaries, and that watershed-based land
use planning enables multiple jurisdictions to work together to plan for the protection of
shared natural water resources. Id. at 7, finding 30.
52. Id. at 8, finding 37 (listing California state legal authority for order).
53. Id. at 4, finding 17.
Urban development has three major phases: (1) land use planning for new
development; (2) construction; and (3) the “use” or existing development
phase. Because the Co-permittees authorize, permit, and profit from each of
these phases, and because each phase has a profound impact on water quality,
the Co-permittees have commensurate responsibilities to protect water quality
during each phase.
Id. One may take issue with the finding that co-permittees “profit” from these
development phases on the theory that they are nonprofit entities.
54. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (West 1996).
55. “‘Significant effect on the environment’ means a substantial, or potentially
substantial, adverse change in the environment.” CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21068.
56. See supra note 30.
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permit on the theory that it was issued in violation of CEQA.57 The
regional board maintains that federal law authorizes California to adopt
the provisions contained in the MS4 permit, and thus CEQA is not
applicable.58 The BIA challenge raises an issue of general importance:
the application of CEQA to storm water permits that contain provisions
either more numerous, more specific or detailed, or more stringent than
those contained in federal law or regulations.
The BIA argues that CEQA applies, that the San Diego permit was
issued in violation of CEQA, and that both the regional board and state
board erroneously applied section 13389 of the Water Code, which
contains the CEQA exemption. It maintains that section 13389 only
exempts permit provisions required to meet the nondiscretionary
requirements of the CWA. In brief, the BIA claims that the California
Legislature did not give the regional board a CEQA “pass” for anything
other than the CWA mandates and that the San Diego MS4 permit goes
far beyond the federal requirements, thus subjecting it to CEQA review.59
The analysis of this position usefully begins by identifying two
considerations that are not in issue. First is the purpose of CEQA. It is
intended to provide the fullest possible protection to the environment
within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.60 It is geared
toward accomplishing this goal by informing government decisionmakers
and the public about the potential adverse environmental effects of
proposed projects and by preventing avoidable environmental damage
from those projects.61 Thus, CEQA is intended to both inform and prevent
avoidable harm.
57. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate Re: (1) California Environmental
Quality Act; (2) Clean Water Act; (3) California Water Code; (4) California
Constitution; (5) California Code of Civil Procedure; (6) California Administrative
Procedures Act; (7) Statutory Record Review and California Constitution; Verified
Complaint for (8) Declaration Relief; and (9) Injunctive Relief, Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of
San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal. Super. Ct. 2001) (No. 780263)
[hereinafter Petition for Writ of Mandate]. The BIA petitioned the court for a writ of
mandate asking that the storm water permit be vacated and reissued in compliance with
law, after consultation with the petitioners. Id. at 1.
58. Brief for State of California at 3–4, Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County
v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (Cal. Super. Ct.) (No. 780263).
59. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 57, at 10–12.
60. “It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state government . . .
shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing
environmental damage . . . .” CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West 1996).
61. DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CURTIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW
111–12 (20th ed. 2000).
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The second point not in issue is that projects proposed by developers
and others subject to the MS4 permit are subject to CEQA review at the
time they apply to the local land use authority for development, thus
insuring environmental review. CEQA applies to such proposals as part
of the normal development process. In other words, the CEQA exemption
applies only to the issuance of the MS4 permit by the regional board; the
exemption is not relevant to projects proposed by developers pursuant to
the MS4 permit.
The issuance of the MS4 permit by the regional board in and of itself
has no immediate impact on the environment. It simply establishes
requirements that must be met to be in compliance with federal and state
law. Perhaps this is the reason why the BIA alleges that the plaintiffs
“will be adversely affected by the changes to the environment caused by
the Permit in that Petitioners and their members engage in homebuilding,
construction, development, the provision of municipal services including
firefighting, and the exercise of municipal land use authority,”62 not that
the environment will be adversely affected.
Assuming arguendo that CEQA applies to the MS4 permit issued by
the regional board, the correct application of the CEQA exemption
found in section 13389 of the California Water Code is critical. This
section provides: “Neither the state board nor the regional boards shall
be required to comply with the provisions of [CEQA] prior to the
adoption of any waste discharge requirement . . . .”63 As used in
California, the term “waste discharge requirement” is the statutory
equivalent of the term “NPDES permit” employed in the CWA.64
To the extent that the MS4 permit is based on the CWA, the statutory
language of section 13389 exempts the issuance of the permit from
CEQA. This conclusion is clear. The California Supreme Court has
observed: “If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for
construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the
Legislature . . . . Words used . . . ‘should be given the meaning they bear
in ordinary use.’”65
The state board relied on this principle in its recent MS4
administrative decision holding that section 13389 generally exempts the
issuance of MS4 permits from the CEQA process.
As we have stated in several prior orders, the provisions of CEQA requiring
adoption of environmental documents do not apply to NPDES permits. BIA
contends that the exemption from CEQA contained in section 13389 applies
62.
63.
64.
65.
omitted).
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only to the extent that the specific provisions of the permit are required by the
federal Clean Water Act. This contention is easily rejected without addressing
whether federal law mandated all of the permit provisions. The plain language
of section 13389 broadly exempts the Regional Water Board from the
requirements of CEQA to prepare environmental documents when adopting
“any waste discharge requirement” pursuant to Chapter 5.5 (13370 et seq.,
which applies to NPDES permits). BIA cites the decision in Committee for a
Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Board. That case upheld
the State Water Board’s view that section 13389 applies only to NPDES
permits, and not to waste discharge requirements that are adopted pursuant only
to state law. The case did not concern an NPDES permit, and does not support
BIA’s argument.66

The Gilroy decision is factually distinguishable and does not squarely
support the state board’s decision. In Gilroy, a final EIR was prepared
for the expansion of a wastewater treatment plant, which admittedly was
a “project” under CEQA.67 The court found that the challenged orders
were issued under the exclusive authority of the Porter-Cologne Act.
The orders were not required by the CWA.68 Therefore, Gilroy does not
specifically answer the question of whether the statutory exemption
applies to situations when the permit generally is based on federal law,
but certain provisions of the permit exceed the requirements of federal law.
The CWA generally recognizes independent state authority to enact
and implement its own standards and requirements provided that they
are at least as stringent as those required by the CWA.69 With respect to
the specific regulation of storm water, the CWA provides that permits
“[s]hall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the
maximum extent practicable, including management practices, control
techniques and system design and engineering methods, and such other
provisions as the Administrator or the State determines appropriate for
the control of such pollutants.”70 The italicized language authorizes
states to adopt storm water controls that are determined appropriate even
though they may exceed federal requirements.
Although undoubtedly authorized by federal law to act, state law
controls the application of the CEQA exemption. Chapter 5.5 of the
66. In re Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County & W. States Petroleum Ass’n,
SWRCB Order 2001-15, 13 (Nov. 15, 2001) (citation omitted), available at
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/wqorders/2001/wqo/wqo2001-15.pdf.
67. Comm. for a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal.
Rptr. 732–33 (Ct. App. 1987).
68. Id. at 732.
69. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000).
70. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (emphasis
added).
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Water Code,71 which contains the exemption, was added by the
California Legislature in order to allow the state to implement or
administer the provisions of the CWA.72 Read in isolation, section
13389 provides a strong argument for exempting the MS4 permit from
CEQA. Moreover, the argument is buttressed by the fact that it is the
only section to specifically reference CEQA.
However, statutes should be read in context. Section 13372 provides
the arguable context for narrowly reading the exemption. It states that
chapter 5.5 “shall be construed to assure consistency with the
requirements for state programs implementing” the CWA and that “[t]he
provisions of this chapter shall apply only to actions required under
[CWA] and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto.”73 This
limitation raises the derivative question as to whether the MS4 permit is
an “action” required by the CWA. Unfortunately, the section does not
define the term “action.”
On the one hand, one may argue that the term “action” is defined by
the initiating federal requirement to issue MS4 permits and the
accompanying authorization to go beyond federal law. According to this
view the permit is indivisible, and the term “action” includes all of the
constituent parts of the permit regardless of whether they exceed federal
law. This interpretation would mean that the CEQA exemption applies.
On the other hand, if the term “action” refers to the specific provisions
of the permit, then the exemption might not apply to those permit
provisions based exclusively on state law. But this construction is
problematic. Section 13377 of the Water Code authorizes regional
boards to issue waste discharge requirements that “apply and ensure
compliance with all applicable provisions of the act [CWA]” as well as
“any more stringent effluent standards or limitations necessary to
implement water quality control plans, or for the protection of beneficial
uses, or to prevent nuisance.”74 This section is instructive to the proper
interpretation of the term “action.” It supports the view that the term
“action” should be broadly construed to cover all of the provisions of the
permit because the legislature used specific language, “standards or
limitations,” when it wanted to identify specific provisions within the
permit that go beyond the requirements of the CWA.
Given the broad grant of authority under federal law and the expressed
intent by the California Legislature to exercise its authority, the preferred
interpretation is to apply the exemption without delineating the overlap with
71.
72.
73.
74.
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federal law. There are several policy considerations that justify treating the
permit as a whole for purposes of applying the CEQA exemption.
Unless one was to successfully argue that the permit in its entirety is
subject to CEQA, which is a dubious proposition, the permit would have
to be dissected in order to determine which parts were subject to CEQA.
The first policy concern is whether this approach is practical. The
selective application of CEQA to parts of the permit would necessitate
successfully disentangling the federal and state provisions in order to
apply CEQA to the state-based part of the permit. This task would be
both factually and legally difficult, especially in light of the broad grants
of authority.75
Another policy consideration is whether the purposes of CEQA would
be advanced by selective application to the state-based portion of the
permit. Actually, the opposite might occur. The goal of protecting the
environment could be undermined by a narrow or selective application
of the exemption. The administration of CEQA would become
significantly more complicated and administratively difficult in the area
of storm water permitting. For example, if the state-based monitoring
requirement were found to go beyond that required under the CWA, the
monitoring requirement would be arguably subject to CEQA, but
presumably not the other provisions of the permit.
Finally, the CEQA process applies to “projects,”76 which are required
by law to be defined with sufficient specificity to make the CEQA
process capable of sensible application. Given that the MS4 area permit
covers a large geographic region, properly defining the project so that
CEQA could be sensibly applied would be next to impossible. The
reason is straightforward. There is no actual project until a specific
proposal is submitted by someone subject to the permit. This point is
75. The URMPs impose restrictions that apply to infiltration and groundwater.
Federal courts are divided on the application of the CWA to groundwater. Compare
Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that “[n]either the Clean Water Act nor the EPA’s definition asserts authority
over ground waters, just because these may be hydrologically connected with surface
waters”), with Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1319–20 (S.D.
Iowa 1997) (holding that “[b]ecause the CWA’s goal is to protect the quality of surface
waters, the NPDES permit system regulates any pollutants that enter such waters either
directly or through groundwater”). In Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng’r, the Supreme Court may have indicated that isolated ground
water is not subject to CWA jurisdiction, but this interpretation is far from certain. 531
U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001).
76. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 1996) (defining the term “project”).
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critical to the future success of storm water permitting. Unless the
federal and state-based requirement could be separated and sensibly
applied to the facts, applying CEQA would undoubtedly mean the end to
area-wide storm water permits, a result which would contravene the
express language of CWA authorizing such permits.
B. Section 402(p) of the Clean Water Act
The application of the MEP standard has generated controversy. One
concern involves the analytical link between the MEP77 standard and the
“water quality standard” that defines the water quality goals for a water
body.78 This concern is acute when a municipal storm water permit
prohibits storm water discharges that cause or contribute to a violation
of water quality standards and also imposes the MEP standard.
Undoubtedly, some of the controversy surrounding the application of the
MEP stems from the fact that neither the CWA nor federal regulations
define the term “MEP.” In this situation, the correct fit between the two
standards is critical. It is also a focal point for potential litigation.
The phase II storm water regulations provide an explanation for the
absence of a definition: “There is no regulatory definition of MEP in order
to allow the permitting authority and regulated MS4s maximum flexibility
in their interpretation of it” as they develop and implement their
77. The EPA has identified the following factors as relevant to the MEP standard:
(1) storm water discharge size, (2) climate, (3) implementation schedules, (4) current
ability to finance the program, (5) hydrology, (6) capacity to perform operation and
maintenance, (8) conditions of receiving waters, and (9) other specific local concerns and
aspects included in a comprehensive watershed plan. National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program
Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,754 (Dec. 8, 1999) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124) (phase II storm water rules).
78. Federal water quality standards consist of two components: (1) the goals or
designated beneficial uses for waters, and (2) the water quality criteria to support those
goals or beneficial uses. Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(i) (2001). The
water quality criteria identify the constituent concentrations or levels to support a
designated beneficial use. 40 C.F.R. § 131(b). The concentrations or levels are
expressed either in numeric or narrative terms, and are simply the means to reach the
stated goal. Id. For example, a designated beneficial use might be “contact water
recreation,” such as swimming, wading, and water skiing. The associated water quality
criteria for contact water recreation expressed in numeric terms might be that the average
level of fecal coliform bacteria concentration for any thirty day period shall not exceed
2000 cells/100 milliliters of water. A narrative or descriptive formulation might provide
that the waters “be free of floating debris, scum and other materials.” For an example of
a Water Quality Control Plan, see generally Water Quality Control Plan for the San Diego
Basin (9), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/programs/basinplan.html.
The California Water Code uses the term “water quality objectives” as an equivalent to
the federal term “water quality criteria.” CAL. WATER CODE § 13050(h) (West 1992).
Section 13050(f) of the California Water Code generally describes the beneficial uses
that may be protected.
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programs.79 The San Diego MS4 permit adds some additional detail:
[T]he definition of MEP is dynamic and will be defined by the following
process over time: municipalities propose their definition of MEP by way of
their Urban Runoff Management Plan. Their total collective and individual
activities conducted pursuant to the Urban Runoff Management Plan becomes
their proposal for MEP as it applies both to their overall effort, as well as to
specific activities (e.g., MEP for street sweeping, or MEP for municipal
separate storm sewer maintenance).80

In the absence of a proposal acceptable by the co-permittee, the San
Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board (SDRWQCB) retains the
control to define MEP.
The San Diego MS4 permit requires co-permittees to meet both the
MEP standard and water quality standards.81 An iterative, consensusbased process is to be used when a storm water discharge exceeds water
quality standards. If a receiving water quality standard is exceeded, the
co-permittee is required to submit a written report identifying the
additional best management practices (BMPs) or other measures that
will be taken to achieve water quality standards. The co-permittee is
then required to revise its JURMP and implement the revised plan.82
This approach carries the benefit of building into the process
experimentation based on actual practices.
Once this protocol has been completed, the co-permittee “does not
have to repeat the same procedure for continuing or recurring
exceedances to the same receiving water limitations unless directed by
the SDRWQCB to do so.”83 This process of attempting to achieve
compliance with the water quality standard is an application of the MEP
standard. Properly understood, the iterative protocol is consistent with
the MEP standard.
There may be instances, however, when the iterative process does not
sufficiently protect the public interest. This would occur in cases when
continuing or recurring exceedances of water quality standards occur.84
79. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, STORM WATER PHASE
II COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE GUIDE § 4.6.1 (2000).
80. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at D-3.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id. at 10–11.
83. Id. at 11.
84. Industrial dischargers must meet the effluent provisions found in section 1311
of the United States Code. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A) (2000). Section 1311 requires
that dischargers, including industrial dischargers, “shall . . . achiev[e] . . . any more
stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards . . .
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In this situation, the permit gives the SDRWQCB the right to mandate
that increased steps be taken by the co-permittee to achieve water quality
standards.85
One may argue that the San Diego MS4 permit violates the MEP
requirement of section 402(p). The BIA, for example, argued that the
co-permittees are required to implement more onerous BMPs, regardless
of whether those additional BMPs exceed the MEP standard.86 This
claim appears to be an attack, albeit indirect, on the use of water quality
standards in the permit. If so, the argument should be assessed based on
the decision in Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner.87
In Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs argued that the EPA was
required or mandated by the CWA to use state water quality standards in
the contested MS4 permit.88 The Ninth Circuit upheld the EPA’s
discretion to use or not use water quality standards in the challenged
storm water permit.89 In other words, the court held that the EPA has
the discretionary authority to determine that ensuring strict compliance
with state water quality standards is necessary to control pollutants.
The state board followed this reasoning in the administrative challenge
to the San Diego MS4 permit when it concluded that “[t]he Regional
Water Board appropriately required compliance with water quality
standards and included requirements to achieve reduction of pollutants
to the maximum extent practicable.”90 According to the state board’s
reading of Defenders of Wildlife, regional boards generally are
empowered to issue MS4 permits that require compliance with water
quality standards through iterative BMPs.91
Alternatively, the BIA’s claim may be that the permit requires “zero
contribution” of pollutants in runoff, and “in effect” contains numeric
established pursuant to any State law or regulation . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1311. This
approach is consistent with the one taken by the NPDES permit for storm water
discharges by Caltrans. See State Water Res. Control Bd., Order No. 99-06-DWQ, ¶ C1-3 (July 15, 1999), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/wqorders/1999/wqo9906.html. Unfortunately, the situation with respect to MS4 permitting is not clearly
stated.
85. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 11–12.
86. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 57, at 13.
87. 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).
88. Id. at 1161.
89. Id. at 1166.
90. In re Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County & W. States Petroleum Ass’n,
SWRCB Order WQ 2001-15, 16 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/
resdec/wqorders/2001/wqo/wqo2001-15.pdf.
91. To ensure that MS4 discharges comply with water quality standards, the state
board has adopted the EPA’s language which dictates implementation of an iterative
process when water quality standards are not met. State Water Res. Control Bd., Order
No. WQ-99-05, at 1 (June 17, 1999), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/
wqorders/1999/wqo99-05.html.
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effluent limitations. This view is also problematic. This argument was
addressed by the state board when it observed, “this simply is not
true.”92 The state board concluded that “[t]he permit is clearly BMPbased, and there are no numeric effluent limitations.”93 Although the
state board recognized the option of using numeric effluent discharges
where site-specific conditions call for them, the state board obviously
thought that the emphasis in the San Diego MS4 permit was on the use
of BMPs.
C. Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act and Local Authority
The BIA contends that the MS4 permit violates the general provisions
of the CWA.94 It argues that these CWA provisions preserve and protect
“the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water
resources . . . .”95 In the BIA’s view, the permit unlawfully interferes
with the valid exercise by local government of its land use authority.96
The BIA specifically identifies the JURMP (section F of the permit) as
objectionable based on this theory. Among other contentions, it
identifies the “development project approval processes” as infringing on
the co-permittees’ right to regulate land use and “unlawfully direct the
co-permittees to regulate” as the regional board and state board see fit.97
In assessing the force of this argument, one should first realize that
federal law directs states to comply with the dictates of section 402(p) of
the CWA. Next, it is apparent that section 101(b) of the CWA preserves
the rights of the states, not local government.
The California Constitution grants cities the power to “make and
enforce within [their] limits all local, police, sanitary, and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”98
However, there are two limitations stated in this constitutional grant of
power. One is the jurisdictional or territorial limitation, and the other is
92. In re Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County & W. States Petroleum Ass’n,
SWRCB Order WQ 2001-15, at 8 n.17 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.swrcb.
ca.gov/resdec/wqorders/2001/wqo/wqo2001-15.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 57, at 13.
95. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 13–14.
98. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
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the subordination of local authority to state law.
Local land use authority is conferred by the California Constitution.
In exercising this authority, local government is constrained by the
general laws of the state. The Porter-Cologne Act grants the state and
regional boards the authority to issue and administer storm water
permits. To the extent that this is seen as interfering with the authority
of local government, as is argued by the BIA, this authority arguably has
been preempted by the action of the California Legislature.99
Finally, there are questions of policy that should inform the analysis.
Monitoring data for San Diego indicates that approximately fifty percent
or more of the total pollutant load for many constituents are contributed
by urban land uses, including residential, commercial, and industrial
activities.100 It seems reasonable to conclude that the prior land use
policies and practices intended to protect water quality from the impacts
of urban development have not been entirely effective. Thus, a
statewide interest exists in controlling the adverse impacts of storm
water pollution, and the state, acting through its regional boards, should
be accorded the opportunity to try creative solutions to rectify an
admittedly serious problem. Broadly implemented new strategies and
techniques, which transcend local interests, are necessary to effectively
deal with the problem. These new storm water approaches are based on
EPA and state board guidance, and are supported by recent and ongoing
technical support. In the final analysis, the JURMP, as well as other
parts of the San Diego MS4 permit, appears consistent with directions
contained in section 101(b) of the CWA .
D. Watershed and Third Party Liability Considerations
In the United States, the concept of water resources management
within watersheds can be detected in early judicial decisions. In 1795,
for example, the court in Merritt v. Parker101 observed that “water flows
in its natural channel, and ought always to be permitted to run there, so
that all, through whose land it pursues its natural course, may continue to
enjoy the privilege of using it for their own purposes.” This view led to
the “natural flow” rule that allowed riparian landowners to use the
natural flow of a river, and prohibited any diversion that would
materially affect the flow to others on the river.102 Other early views,
such as riparian rights only attaching to land within the watershed,
99. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
100. WOODWARD CLYDE, 1997–1998 CITY OF SAN DIEGO AND CO-PERMITTEE
NPDES STORMWATER MONITORING PROGRAM REPORT 6–19 (1998) (on file with author).
101. 1 N.J.L. 526, 530 (1795).
102. Id.
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support the notion that water resource management was an important
part of the law at the founding of our country.103
The early focus on water resources management stressed the
efficient use of water for such uses as energy generation, navigation,
farming, and drinking water. In contrast, watershed management, a
concept incorporated into the San Diego MS4 permit, is broader in scope.
It calls for decisionmaking on an integrated or holistic basis. A
“watershed,” “river basin,” or “drainage basin” approach focuses on the
entire surface drainage area of the hydrological unit. It calls for an
analysis of the various land use activities within the watershed.104 In
much the same way that air pollution transcends the jurisdictional lines
between communities, land use activities often bear little or no
relationship to government-drawn boundaries. Thus, it is predictable
that urban runoff will not respect or follow politically defined
boundaries. Except to the extent that it is channeled, it is not a startling
proposition that urban runoff inevitably flows in its natural channels
throughout a particular watershed.
The San Diego MS4 permit requires co-permittees to establish a
WURMP.105 Watershed planning involves four steps: (1) identification of
the shared watersheds; (2) the identification, assessment, and prioritization
of the natural, social, and other watershed resources; (3) prioritization of
areas for growth, protection, and conservation; and (4) development of
plans and regulations to guide growth and protect resources.106 Because
the land use actions within the watershed have both an interrelated and
cumulative impact, co-permittee collaboration is essential to minimizing
receiving water quality degradation from land use activities.
Broad legal authority exists in the CWA, accompanying regulations,
and California Water Code107 to use a watershed approach in water
103. See, e.g., Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 106 S.E. 508, 511–14 (Va. 1921)
(discussing generally cases and treatises on riparian rights).
104. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 42.
105. Id. at 44.
106. SAN DIEGO REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, FACT
SHEET/TECHNICAL REPORT FOR SDRWQCB ORDER NO. R9-2002-0001 68 (2001)
[hereinafter SDRWQCB FACT SHEET].
107. Regional Water Qualify Control Boards are organized in California on
watershed or drainage basin principles. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13200 (West 1992).
The San Diego region, for example, comprises all basins draining into the Pacific Ocean
between the southern boundary of the Santa Ana region and the California-Mexico
border. Id. § 13200(f); see also id. § 13777 (dealing with the implementation of CWA
provisions).
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quality planning. In the CWA’s declaration of goals and policies,
Congress requires federal agencies to “co-operate with State and local
agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and
eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water
resources.”108 Other provisions of the CWA more clearly identify the
call for using watershed principles. Section 319, dealing with state
nonpoint source management programs, provides that “[a] State shall, to
the maximum extent practicable, develop and implement a management
program under this subsection on a watershed-by-watershed basis within
such State.”109
Courts have also recognized the relevance of watershed principles. In
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology,110 the
Supreme Court endorsed a watershed approach in the context of 401
certification.111 The Court held that states could condition certification
of the project on any limitations necessary to ensure compliance with
state water quality standards or other appropriate requirements of state
law, and that the state’s authority to impose minimum flow requirements
is not limited on theory that it interfered with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s authority to license hydroelectric projects.112
In a broad sense, the decision allows states to protect aquatic ecosystems
within the framework of the watershed unit.
Section 402(p) authorizes the issuance of MS4 permits on a
jurisdiction or system-wide basis.113 The federal regulations authorize
permits to be issued on a watershed basis,114 and management programs
may be similarly based.115 Finally, the State Water Resources Control
Board Urban Runoff Technical Advisory Committee recommends that
“municipal permits should have watershed specific components.”116
A watershed approach inevitably raises interjurisdictional complications.
Thus, it is predictable that a common concern raised by co-permittees is
potential liability for pollutant contributions to their MS4 system from
other jurisdictions.
This issue was recently addressed by the
Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) in the City of Irving, Texas MS4

108. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
109. Id. § 1329 (b)(4) (2000).
110. 511 U.S. 700, 717 (1994).
111. Section 401 of the CWA gives states the authority to certify, condition, or veto
federal permits based on state water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
112. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 712, 722.
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
114. Storm Water Discharges, 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(3)(ii), (a)(3)(v), (a)(5) (2001).
115. Id. § 122.26(d)(2)(iv) (“Proposed programs may impose controls on a
systemwide basis, a watershed basis, a jurisdiction basis or on individual outfalls.”).
116. SDRWQCB FACT SHEET, supra note 106, at attach. 2.
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case.117 One of the challenges made by Irving was that the permit made
the city liable for the failure of other co-permittees to fulfill their permit
obligations.118 In essence, Irving argued that it could incur liabilities for
parts of the broader system beyond its operational control.
In analyzing the issue of potential liability for third party co-permittee
conduct, the EAB reasoned:
In anticipation of intra-system, multiple-permit approaches to storm water
management, the [federal] rules provide:
Co-permittees need only comply with permit conditions relating to
discharges from municipal separate storm sewers for which they are the
operators.
40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(iv) (emphasis added). We conclude that the better
interpretation here is one that reconciles the text of the permit with the rule upon
which it is based, and thus interpret [the permit] to mean that irrespective of any
agreements into which Irving might enter related to storm water management,
Irving remains ultimately responsible for those portions—and only those
portions—of the MS4 within its operational control.119

The appeals board went on to recognize that Irving might enter into
legally binding agreements that enlarge the scope of its liability. In such
a case, liability would be based on such an agreement, not on the
permit’s requirement of operational control.120
The question of third party liability in the San Diego MS4 permit is
apt to stem from finding fifteen. This finding is entitled “Co-permittees’
Responsibility for Illicit Discharges from Third Parties.” It states the
following principle:
As operators of MS4s, the Co-permittees cannot passively receive and
discharge pollutants from third parties. By providing free and open access to
an MS4 that conveys discharges to the waters of the United States, the
operator of an MS4 that does not prohibit and/or control discharges into its
system essentially accepts responsibility for those discharges.121

The finding does not distinguish between dischargers within the MS4
117. City of Irving, Texas, Mun. Separate Storm Sewer Sys., Environmental Appeal
Board, No. 00-18 (July 16, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/disk11/irving.pdf
(last visited Jan. 1, 2003). The NPDES MS4 permit was issued to Irving, the Dallas
County Utility and Reclamation District, the Dallas County Flood Control District
(district I), and the Irving Flood Control Districts (sections I and III). Id. at 2.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 25–26.
120. Id. at 26 n.19.
121. Order No. 2001-01, supra note 6, at 4.
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territory and those outside the territory.
Presumably the link between this finding and the operative provisions
of the permit is the section on the elimination of illicit discharges and
connections. It requires each co-permittee to immediately eliminate all
illicit discharges, discharge sources, and connections.122 This requirement
is arguably stricter than the emphasis in the finding on “prohibit and/or
control.” To the extent that an interjurisdictional discharge is treated as an
improper “discharge source,” the permit requires immediate elimination,
not just control. Arguably, the receiving co-permittee is in violation of the
permit if it fails to eliminate the discharge.
As a matter of interpretation, a co-permittee should be held accountable
only to the extent that it has the power to effectively control the
noncomplying interjurisdictional discharge. This construction is informed
and based on the finding that the co-permittee should not simply passively
standby, which suggests a fault-based standard. Thus, to the extent that
the co-permittee has no control and receives no benefit from the
interjurisdictional discharge, imposing liability under such circumstances
would violate fundamental principles of fairness and contravene a faultbased rationale. The paradigm case of potential unfairness would be
where the MS4 system consists of an interjurisdictional natural water
course where the receiving co-permittee is forced to accept the
discharge.123 One possible solution to this situation is an enforcement
action by the regional board against the noncomplying discharger, not
the receiving co-permittee. Another is an interjurisdictional agreement
on rights and duties.
E. Proposition 218: Articles XIIIC and XIIID of the
California Constitution
The funding of local storm water management programs is important
to the future success of storm water regulation in California. In June
2002, the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth District decided
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas.124 In this taxpayer’s
suit against the city of Salinas, the court of appeal held that the city’s
storm water drainage fee was invalid because the fee was adopted
without being submitted for voter approval as required by proposition

122. Id. at 36.
123. See id. at 6, finding 28 (“During its downstream course, urban runoff is
conveyed through lined and unlined (natural, manmade, and partially modified)
channels, all of which are defined as components of the Co-permittees’ MS4.”).
124. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), review denied, 2002 Cal. LEXIS
5938 (2002).
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218.125 The city did adopt the fee, however, in accordance with the
noticing requirements of proposition 218.126
Although the California courts previously have wrestled with the
application of proposition 218 in other factual contexts, Salinas is the
first appellate decision applying it to storm water regulation.127 This fact
is sufficient to make the case important to regulators and those affected
by storm water regulation, but there are additional reasons why the case
is significant.
The Salinas decision has both statewide and local implications. On a
statewide basis, the state has assumed the responsibility for controlling
storm water under the CWA. Storm water management is implemented
and funded at the local level. Funding has been generally accomplished
through discharger fees and charges without the benefit or support of
federal or state funding. Treating storm water fees as subject to voter
approval threatens the viability of many existing municipal storm water
management programs. In doing so, California’s strategy for controlling
storm water discharges through local government is also jeopardized.
The decision also has important local consequences. Municipalities
have been increasingly dependent on the ability to impose fees on the
end users of the MS4. Local government will be inhibited from using
storm water fee programs similar to the one used by Salinas without first
complying with the voter approval process. On the one hand, the court
of appeal decision is likely to breed some degree of uncertainty at the
local level. On the other hand, noncompliance with MS4 permit
requirements will subject local government to enforcement actions, with
accompanying civil liability, brought by regional boards or other citizen
suits. The challenge for co-permittees is compounded by the permit
application process requirement that funding sources be analyzed.128 In
short, the Salinas decision places co-permittees in a bind.
Given the importance of the Salinas decision, a closer look at it is
warranted.129 The city of Salinas maintained separate sanitary and storm
125. Id. at 234.
126. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(a).
127. The California Supreme Court recently granted review of a case involving a
proposition 218 challenge to a water connection charge for fire suppression. Richmond
v. Shasta Comty. Serv. Dist., 47 P.3d 222 (2002).
128. Storm Water Discharges, 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)(vi) (2001) (“Such analysis
shall include a description of the source of funds that are proposed to meet the necessary
expenditures, including legal restrictions on the use of such funds.”).
129. The California attorney general has issued two possibly contradictory opinions
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water systems, which is common practice in California. In order to fund
and comply with the federal CWA storm water requirements, the city
adopted a storm water management utility fee. The fee was imposed on
every developed parcel of land and the owners and occupiers. The fee
was then calculated in proportion to the degree to which the impervious
area of the land contributed runoff to the city’s storm water drainage
system.130 Undeveloped property in a natural state was not subject to the
fee. The court of appeal found that the storm water fee was subject to
voter approval under proposition 218 and was invalid because the fee
had not been submitted to the voters for their approval.131
on the subject of article XIIID. In 1998, the attorney general concluded that a Vallejo
Sanitation District storm sewer user fee was not exempt under article XIIID. 81 Op. Cal.
Att’y Gen. 104, 110 (1998). Although the specific concern was the application of
section 6(b)(3), id. at 105, the attorney general did find the storm water fee “propertyrelated,” id. at 107. See also CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(b)(3) (“The amount of a fee or
charge imposed upon any parcel or person as an incident of property ownership shall not
exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.”). In 2001, the
attorney general addressed the following question: “May a city impose storm drainage
pollution abatement charges with respect to property owned by school districts . . .
within the city’s boundaries to fund the city’s activities in meeting federal stormwater
discharge requirements?” 84 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 61 (2001). Without considering article
XIIID, the attorney general found that storm water fees are permissible under section
5471 of the Health and Safety Code, which expressly authorizes cites to establish
charges for their storm drainage services. Id. at 62. These user fees could be imposed by
a city upon local school districts within its boundaries to fund the city’s service
activities, not capital facilities, in meeting NPDES federal storm water requirements. Id.
at 65.
130. Historically, Salinas maintained its storm and surface water management
system through general fund expenditures. However, faced with the CWA NPDES
mandate, on June 1, 1999, the City Council adopted ordinance 2350 to establish a storm
water management and discharge control program, and ordinance 2351 to create an
enterprise and utility of the city as the means to serve the funding and maintenance of
this program. Brief for the Appellant at 3–5, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of
Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (No. H022665).
Ordinance 2351 established a storm water management utility fee imposed upon users
of the storm water drainage system, with the basis and amount of the fee to be
established by resolution. On July 20, 1999, the Council adopted Resolution No. 17019
establishing rates and regulations for the Storm and Surface Water Management System
Enterprise and Utility. This resolution established storm drainage fees in the amount of
$18.66 per year on each single-family residential parcel. For multiple-family and
commercial parcels, the annual storm drainage fee was calculated at the rate of $5.5196
per 1,000 square feet of “impervious area” on the property. The implementing
regulations exempt “undeveloped” property, and also allow an exemption or a
proportional reduction to developed parcels that have their own maintained storm water
management facilities that do not fully utilize city facilities to make no substantial or
only a partial contribution of storm or surface water to the city’s storm drainage
facilities. The purpose of these fees was to provide a method for payment of all or any
part of the cost and expense of improving, maintaining, and operating storm and surface
water control facilities, including all or any part of the cost and expense for planning,
designing, establishing, developing, and constructing such facilities, or to pay or secure
the payment of all or any portion of any indebtedness incurred for such purpose. Id.
131. Salinas, 121 Cal Rptr. 2d at 231.
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The California electorate approved proposition 218, which was entitled
by its authors as the “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” on November 5,
1996.132 It added articles XIIIC and XIIID to the California Constitution,
and in doing so made numerous fundamental changes to local government
finance law. The general thrust of the law was to limit the methods by
which local government could exact revenue from taxpayers without their
consent.133
The city of Salinas first argued that the storm water fee was not
subject to article XIIID. If the fee was subject to the general provisions
of article XIIID, the city then argued that the fee was exempt under the
special service fee provisions stated in the law.134 Neither argument
made by the city was successful.
1.

Sections 6 and 2(e) of Article XIIID: “Incident of Property
Ownership” Fees Require Voter Approval

Several provisions of article XIIID were important to the claim before
the court of appeal. Article XIIID, section 6, deals with the need for
voter approval for new or increased fees and charges. It contains the
following operative provision:
Except for fees or charges for sewer, water, and refuse collection services, no
property related fee or charge shall be imposed or increased unless and until that
fee or charge is submitted and approved by a majority vote of the property
owners of the property subject to the fee or charge or, at the option of the
agency, by a two-thirds vote of the electorate siding in the affected area.135

132. For one of the most authoritative sources on proposition 218, see LEAGUE OF
CALIFORNIA CITIES, PROPOSITION 218 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE (2000), available at
http://www.cacities.org/doc.asp?id=603. The 1997 Implementation Guide was cited
approvingly in McBrearty v. City of Brawley, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 n.5 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997). See generally Robert E. Merritt & Rajiv Parikh, The Proposition 218
Odyssey: New Challenges for Real Property Development, 20 REAL PROP. L. REP. 70
(1997) (discussing major changes required by proposition 218, and proposing
alternatives for financing public improvements); John S. Throckmorton, What is a
Property-Related Fee? An Interpretation of California’s Proposition 218, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 1059 (1997) (drawing on legislation to discuss the meaning of a “property-related
fee”); Mona Patel, Comment, Is Nothing Certain but Death? The Uncertainty Created by
California’s Proposition 218, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (2001) (arguing for a definition of
“property-related fee” that takes into account a direct relationship to property
ownership).
133. Proposition 218 § 2, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 218 (West).
134. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232–34.
135. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(c). The election shall be conducted not less than
forty-five days after the public hearing. Id. § 6(a)(2).
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In applying this section, one must turn to the definition of “fee,”
which is found in section 2(e).136 The term “fee” is defined as a levy
imposed “upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property
ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related
service.”137 Unfortunately, the triggering provision “as an incident of
property ownership” is not defined. Nevertheless, it seems clear that if
the fee is not imposed “as an incident of property ownership,” then
section 6 of article XIIID does not apply and voter approval is not
necessary.
Although the phrase “as an incident of property ownership” is not
defined, section 2(e) contains the clause, “including a user fee” for a
“property-related service.” The scope of the term “property-related
service” is defined in section(2)(h) as “a public service having a direct
relationship to property ownership.”138 Thus, if the user fee has a direct
relationship to property ownership then voter approval is required. If the
fee is considered indirect, then one would have to determine whether the
fee is imposed “as an incident of property ownership.”
This
methodology would be necessary because of the direct relationship to a
property requirement.
Salinas argued the drainage fee was a user fee that was commensurate
with the cost of providing the storm water service to those who elect to
use the service.139 The fee was not imposed as an incident of property
ownership or as a user fee for a property-related service. Its theory was
that a property owner could be exempt or have the fee proportionally
reduced by maintaining a storm water management facility on the
property or avoid the fee in its entirety by leaving the property in its
natural state. Thus, because an owner or occupier might own property
without being subject to the fee or have it reduced by not fully utilizing
the drainage system, the fee was not being imposed as an incident of
property ownership.
The court found that the storm water fee was a property-related
service because it was closely tied to the physical properties of the
parcel.140 The fee was tied to the physical properties of the parcel
because developed parcels with larger impervious areas were charged
more than those with comparably rain-absorbing parcels. In simple
terms, the court seemed to be saying that “if you own developed
property, you have to pay the storm water fee” and that makes it directly
related to property ownership. The options of maintaining a storm water
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

274

Id. § 2(e).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 2(h).
Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230.
Id.

PRINTERMINAN.DOC

[VOL. 40: 245, 2003]

1/15/2020 4:28 PM

Municipal Storm Water Permitting
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

management facility on the property or securing a proportional reduction
was characterized as misleading because “it suggests that the property
owner can avoid the fee altogether by declining the service.”141 In its
analysis, the court did not consider the possibility of avoiding the fee by
leaving it in its natural state.
In applying article XIIID, the court relied on the principle that words
should be given their natural and ordinary meaning so as to effectuate
the purpose of proposition 218. The voters had directed that “[t]he
provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
purposes of limiting local government revenue and enhancing taxpayer
consent.”142 To interpret the fee as a use-based fee, the court reasoned,
would contravene the stated objectives of voters’ purpose as expressed
in proposition 218.143
The California Supreme Court decision in Apartment Ass’n of Los
Angeles v. City of Los Angeles144 is fundamental to understanding the
application of article XIIID. It was the first decision by the California
Supreme Court analyzing article XIIID, section 6. The court held that a
city-imposed fee on residential rental properties for the purpose of
funding a program for the eradication of substandard housing was not
subject to article XIIID, section 6.145 It reasoned that the challenged fee,
which was imposed without meeting the noticing or voting requirements
of article XIIID, was imposed on its subjects because of their business
ownership, renting apartments, not because they were landowners.146
The fee was more in the nature of business license charge than an
exaction against the property because the fee was imposed only on those
who engaged in the residential rental business. In the words of the court,
“[i]n this case, the relationship between the city’s inspection fee and
property ownership is indirect—it is overlain by the requirement that the
landowner be a landlord.”147
The court reasoned that the plain meaning of article XIIID, section 6
141. Id. at 231.
142. Section 5 of proposition 218 provides: “Liberal Construction. The provisions
of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local
government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent.” Proposition 218 § 5, 1996 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Prop. 218 (West).
143. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231.
144. 14 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2001).
145. Id. at 937–40.
146. Id. at 937–38.
147. Id. at 938.
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was “that it applies only to exactions levied solely by virtue of property
ownership.”148 This language established a bright line test for assessing
the voter approval requirements. Thus, if the fee for storm water
services is not imposed solely because the subject is a property owner,
the voting approval provisions do not apply.
There are several arguments that the Salinas decision wrongly applies
section 6. First, the court of appeal decision appears to be at odds with
the supreme court’s test in Apartment Ass’n of Los Angeles that the fee
be levied solely by virtue of property ownership.149 The storm water fee
applies because the drainage activities from the property contribute
storm water to the city’s storm sewer system. The size of the fee relates
to the type of use, the imperviousness of the surface, and the discharge
to the storm sewer system, not to property ownership. Another
consideration militates against treating the fee as based solely on
property ownership—not all property owners have to pay. To the extent
the property owner ceases to contribute storm water to the system, the
fee is not applicable. Thus, the fee seems more tied to the demand
placed on the MS4 than on the property ownership.
Second, the Salinas decision did not examine whether the storm water
fee is based on an incident of property ownership. Rather, it shifted the
analysis to whether the storm water fee is a user fee or charge for a
property related service. The court of appeal concluded that: “Resolution
No. 17019 plainly established a property-related fee for a propertyrelated service, the management of storm water runoff from the
‘impervious’ areas of each parcel in the City.”150
Assuming for the sake of argument that the issue is determined by
whether the fee is a “property-related service,” the public service is
required to have a “direct relationship to property ownership.”151 To the
extent that the service is indirectly related, the fee should not be deemed
148. Id.
149. The decision also appears at variance with the court of appeal’s decision in
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905 (Ct. App.
2002). The second district held that water rates established by Los Angeles were charges
for water service based primarily on the amount consumed. Id. at 908. The rates were
not fees for a property-related service, and thus the water rates were not subject to article
XIIID. Id. This decision supports the view that storm sewer charges based primarily on
the amount of service rendered or consumed would be exempt from voter approval. The
sixth district attempted to distinguish this decision by saying: “[t]his is not a charge
directly based on or measured by use, comparable to the metered use of water or the
operation of a business . . . .” Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas, 121
Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 231 (Ct. App. 2002). No judicial authority supports the view that a
user fee depends on the existence of a metering device.
150. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230.
151. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 2(h) (“‘Property-related service’ means a public
service having a direct relationship to property ownership.”).
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property-related. If indirectly related, this would mean that the issue
must be analyzed under the controlling “incident of property ownership”
clause because the subordinate “property-related fee” clause coverage
does not cover all the possible fees and charges falling within the scope
of article XIIID, section 6.
As previously noted, the storm water fee is based on impervious
surface area, which is used to calculate the proportional share of the cost
to operate and maintain the storm sewer system. Since the storm water
fee is related to the amount of storm water runoff generated on the
property, in the same way that the inspection fee in Apartment Ass’n of
Los Angeles was related to the activity of renting, the amount of storm
water contributed to the MS4 is at most indirectly related to the
ownership of the property. Because the fee can be avoided by not
contributing storm water to the MS4 system, the fee arguably is
indirectly related to property ownership. As a result, the proper inquiry,
which was not done by the court of appeal, is whether the fee is imposed
solely as an incident of property ownership.
If the term “incident of property ownership” is applied in a manner
consistent with its ordinary meaning, the term would mean that the fee
must be paid solely because the person owns property, and for no other
reason. This construction is consistent both with the Apartment Ass’n of
Los Angeles decision and the focus of proposition 218 on the property
ownership. From this perspective, the storm water fee is related to the
discharge and management of storm water from the property rather than
being inseparably connected to property ownership.
2. Section 6(c) of Article XIIID: Exemption for Sewer,
Water, and Refuse Collection Services
As noted above, the requirement for voter approval for new or
increased fees and charges is subject to the following exception
contained in section 6(c): “Except for fees or charges for sewer, water,
and refuse collection services, no property related fee or charge shall be
imposed or increased” without voter approval.152 To the extent that the
storm water fee is for sewer or water services, it is exempt from the
article XIIID voter approval requirement.
As a matter of statutory construction, exemptions to the general
purpose of the statute are strictly construed. Furthermore, the one
152.

Id. § 6(c).
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seeking the benefit of the exemption must establish its application.153
But these established principles operate within the confines of the words
actually used, in this case by the voters, and is not a fishing license to go
beyond those words.154
Article XIIID does not define the term “sewer.” The court of appeal
in Salinas begins its analysis by finding the term “sewer” ambiguous or
otherwise imprecise. It then sought to resolve this difficulty by relying
on voter intent.
The starting point then is whether the term is in fact ambiguous or too
imprecise. Plaintiffs’ Taxpayers Association claimed that the exemption
was inapplicable. It argued that section 6(c) does not distinguish
between the sanitary sewer system and the storm sewer system. Section
5(a) of article XIIID, as well as the city’s ordinance, distinguishes
sewers from “drainage” systems,155 and thus, an ambiguity exists.156
Plaintiffs then argued the constructional maxim that “if a statute on a
particular subject omits a particular provision, inclusion of that provision
in another related statute indicates an intent [that] the provision is not
applicable to the statute from which it was omitted.”157 The obvious
purpose of the argument was to confirm the ambiguity and then to offer
a narrow reading of the exemption, one that confined its application to
sanitary sewers.
In contrast, the city argued that the commonly accepted dictionary
meaning of the term “sewer” includes both sanitary and storm sewers.158
Thus, the reference is not ambiguous and the exemption applies to both.
It supported its view that storm drains are simply a type of sewer by
citing the Public Utilities Code,159 as well as the Salinas City Code.160
153. City of Lafayette v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 665 (Ct.
App. 1993).
154. See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of San Diego, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d
804, 808 (Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 1999 Cal. LEXIS 5631 (Cal. Aug. 18, 1999):
Proposition 218 provides it is to be liberally construed (Proposition 218, § 5).
Liberal construction cannot overcome the plain language of Proposition 218
limiting the scope of its assessments to assessments based on real property.
Nor is there anything in the language of Proposition 218, or in the ballot
arguments, that supports a conclusion Proposition 218 was intended to
encompass assessments imposed in the 1989 Act. Nothing in the ballot
arguments or language of the proposition would have alerted the electorate to
such a construction.
155. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 5(a) (“Any assessment imposed exclusively to
finance the capital costs or maintenance and operation expense for . . . sewers, water,
flood control, drainage systems or vector control.”).
156. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 232–
33 (Ct. App. 2002).
157. Id. at 232 (quoting In re Marquis D., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 207 (Ct. App.
1995)).
158. Id.
159. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 230.5 (West 1975) (“Sewer system” encompasses all
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Other arguments were available, but not made. The Government Code
provisions on conveyance works in connection with sewer or drainage
improvements inclusively refer to any sanitary sewer, storm sewer, or
drainage improvements.161 Furthermore, numerous California cases
have refused to distinguish between sanitary sewers and storm drains.162
The court of appeal in Salinas found the term “sewer” ambiguous, and
then resolved the constructional issue in terms of what most voters would
have thought the term “sewer” to mean. It reasoned, “[t]he popular,
nontechnical sense of sewer service, particularly when placed next to
‘water’ and ‘refuse collection’ services, suggests the service familiar to most
households and businesses, the sanitary sewerage system.”163 The voters’
intent, in the court’s opinion, was that the term “sewer” included only the
sanitary sewer services, and therefore, the exemption did not apply.
But the term “sewer” is not ambiguous. This result was divined more
by judicial fiat than by reference to any supporting evidence, such as that
contained in the information pamphlet or other statements to the public
accompanying proposition 218. The failure to cite such evidence was
understandable. No such evidence was available. The guiding principle
property connected with “sewage collection, treatment, or disposition for sanitary or
drainage purposes, including . . . all drains, conduits, and outlets for surface or storm
waters, and any and all other works, property or structures necessary or convenient for
the collection or disposal of sewage, industrial waste, or surface or storm waters.”).
160. The City of Salinas defines the term “storm drain” as “a sewer which carries
storm and surface waters and drainage, but which excludes sewage and industrial wastes
other than runoff water.” Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232 n.6 (quoting SALINAS, CAL.,
CODE § 36-2).
161. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 23010.3 (West 1988).
Upon adoption of an authorizing resolution by the board of supervisors, in
connection with the construction of any sanitary sewer, storm sewer, or
drainage improvements, a county may expend any of its available funds for
any additional cost of construction of any conveyance works in excess of the
construction required for the current project . . . .
Id.
162. See, e.g., Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 333
P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1959) (citations omitted).
In Southern California Gas Company v. Los Angeles we stated that “In
the absence of a provision to the contrary it has generally been held that a
public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject to an implied
obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary to
make way for a proper governmental use of the streets. The laying of sewers is
a governmental as distinct from a proprietary function under the foregoing
rule.” In this respect no distinction has been made between sanitary sewers
and storm drains or sewers.
Id. (citations omitted).
163. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.
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of statutory construction to ascertain voter intent by turning to the words
actually used by the electorate was brushed aside. Courts should
interpret and apply the words according to their ordinary meaning,164
which the court of appeal failed to do.
The court of appeal would have been well advised to recall the
California Supreme Court’s warning on the slippery slope of voter
intent:
We observed many years ago that even the most conscientious voters may
lack the time to study ballot measures with that degree of thoroughness. Noting
the tendency of voters to rely on the title to describe the content of an initiative,
we agreed implicitly with the Supreme Court of Oregon whose observation we
quoted:
“‘. . . The majority of qualified electors are so much interested in managing
their own affairs that they have no time carefully to consider measures affecting
the general public. A great number of voters undoubtedly have a superficial
knowledge of proposed laws to be voted upon. . . . We think the assertion may
safely be ventured that it is only the few persons who earnestly favor or
zealously oppose the passage of a proposed law initiated by petition who have
attentively studied its contents and know how it will probably affect their
private interests. The greater number of voters do not possess this information
and usually derive their knowledge of the contents of a proposed law from an
inspection of the title thereof, which is sometimes secured only from the very
meager details afforded by a ballot which is examined in an election booth
preparatory to exercising the right of suffrage.’”
Those observations are no less pertinent today. “Voters have neither the
time nor the resources to mount an in depth investigation of a proposed
initiative. Often voters rely solely on the title and summary of the proposed
initiative and never examine the actual wording of the proposal.”165

The court of appeal’s analysis was not informed by the CWA
provisions on storm water regulation, which predate the adoption of
article XIIID. As the earlier discussion reveals, both sanitary sewer
discharges and storm water discharges are subject to regulation as point
sources for purposes of NPDES permitting. The decision to treat them
differently for purposes of applying article XIIID tends to undermine
effective federal and state control by recognizing voter barriers to the
management and control of storm water. As a general matter, that
164. See People v. Knowles, 217 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1950).
[The speculation brush cuts] with the pertinent question: what purpose did the
Legislature seek to express as it strung those words into a statute? The court
turns first to the words themselves for the answer. It may also properly rely on
extrinsic aids, the history of the statute, the legislative debates, committee
reports, statements to the voters on initiative and referendum measures.
Primarily, however, the words, in arrangement that superimposes the purpose
of the Legislature upon their dictionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry,
reminders that whether their arrangement was wisdom or folly, it was wittingly
undertaken and not to be disregarded.
Id. at 5.
165. Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n,
799 P.2d 1220, 1236 (Cal. 1990) (citations omitted).
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reasoning also ignores that low-flow storm water diversion facilities and
structures, which divert storm water to the sanitary sewer system, are
realities in many jurisdictions.
The court of appeal’s reasoning produces a paradoxical result. Both
sanitary sewers and storm sewers carry waste that is harmful to public
health, welfare, and safety. Because sanitary sewer fees are exempt
from the voter approval process, cities may be encouraged to require that
storm water discharges be made to the sanitary sewer system in order to
allow the cost of operation to be recovered by seeking safe harbor under
the section 6(c) exemption. But this type of unintended incentive may
overload the sanitary system to the detriment of the public by
necessitating expanded sanitary system capital improvements.
The court of appeal also found that the exemption for “water
service” applied only to the supply of water, not the disposal of storm
water.166 It reasoned “we cannot subscribe to the City’s suggestion that
the storm drainage fee is ‘for . . . water services.’”167 After the adoption of
proposition 218, the legislature enacted section 53750 of the Government
Code to clarify some of the terms used in articles XIIIC and XIIID,
including “water” which was not defined. Section 53750 defines
“[w]ater” as “any system of public improvements intended to provide for
the production, storage, supply, treatment, or distribution of water.”168
Thus, the average voter, in the court’s view, would envision the term
“water service” as pertaining only to the supply of water for personal,
household, and commercial use, not the provision of storm water
services.169 This conclusion, at least when based on the average voter at
the time proposition 218 was enacted, may be considered suspect
because the legislative clarification occurred after the constitutional
provision was adopted by the voters. To the extent that the clarification
is considered more in the nature of amending or changing the scope of
the proposition, the legislative action would be impermissible because of
its status as a constitutional amendment.170
This concern to one side, there are several aspects to the legislative
clarification of “water” services that suggest that this exemption actually
166. Some jurisdictions tie the storm water fee to water service, and the storm water
fee may appear as a separate line item on a customer’s water and sewer bill. See, e.g.,
SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 64.0408 (2001).
167. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
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encompasses the storm water system. Traditional water service or
supply is also linked to the storm water system. Runoff from overwatered lawns, car washing activities by homeowners, and countless
other activities contributed water to the storm system. Management fees
for these activities seemed clearly tied to water services. Moreover, to
the extent that storm water is stored on a temporary basis, used for
ground water recharge, treated through either on-site treatment facilities
in the MS4 or low-flow diversion projects connected to the sanitary
sewer system, or treated through the incorporation of wetlands into the
MS4, the exemption might be considered consistent with the legislative
clarification of water services.
The California Supreme Court has declined to review the court of
appeal decision in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas.
Therefore, municipalities are left to cope with the decision as they search
for a reliable funding source to allow them to comply with storm water
requirements. In doing so, there are several options available to affected
local agencies.
One option is to use a storm water fee that satisfies the noticing and
voter approval requirements of article XIIID.171 Section (6)(c) requires
approval by a majority vote of the property owners subject to the fee or,
at the option of the fee imposing agency, by a two-thirds vote of the
electorate residing in the affected area.172 This option will necessitate
convincing the voters to support such a fee.
A second approach, one which would obviate the need for voter
approval, would meet the objections with the fee identified in Salinas.
Basing the fee on impervious area made the fee property-related, and
thus subject to voter approval. The court of appeal stressed that the
city’s storm water fee was not based on or measured by use of the storm
water service provided. It was not comparable to the metered use of
water or the operation of a business.173 To the extent that a storm water
fee is based on or measured by the ratepayer’s use of the MS4, then the
voter approval requirements should not trigger section 6. Thus, storm
water consumption-based usage rates for using the MS4, which are
basically commodity charges, would not fall within the scope of the
voter approval requirement.174
171. Article XIIID contains noticing and hearing procedures applicable to new or
increased fees and charges that are property related. CAL. CONST. art XIIID, § 6(a).
These are in addition to the voter approval requirements contained in section 6(c).
172. “Agency” is defined as any local government as defined in section 1(b) of
article XIIIC. Id. § 2(a). The term “‘local government’ means any county, city, city and
county, including a charter city or county, any special district, or any other local or
regional governmental entity.” Id. art. XIIIC, § 1(b).
173. Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231.
174. To comply with Salinas, the storm water rate structure should be correlated to
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A third possibility, one which was not raised or considered in Salinas,
would be to rely on the section 6(c) exemption for “refuse collection
services.” This possibility would be based on regulating the waste found
in storm water. Storm water regulation is premised on controlling the
waste in storm water. As previously discussed, much of the waste that
finds its way into the MS4, such as trash, pesticides, and oils, fits within
the term “refuse” that has not been otherwise properly disposed of or
controlled. Undoubtedly, basing a storm water fee on the refuse exemption
would be challenged. To the extent that the Salinas voter-intent test is
used to ascertain the scope of the exemption, this argument may be
difficult to sustain. In addition, where refuse collection fees are mandatory
on property owners, the fees are likely to be treated as a property related
service subject to article XIIID requirements. To the extent such fees
are voluntary and can be avoided, the argument may be more persuasive.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the regulation of discharges of waste in
storm water from municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s). The
effective regulation of urban storm water is a daunting challenge, one
that is complicated by theoretical, economic, practical, and legal
considerations.
Unlike the sanitary sewer waste water, which is treated by a publicly
owned treatment work (POTW) before being discharged, storm water
usually is discharged to the receiving waters without the benefit of any
treatment. While it is theoretically feasible to combine sanitary and
storm sewers or to treat storm water before it is discharged, full scale
“end-of-pipe” treatment of storm water runoff is not considered
economically or technologically feasible at this time.
the services consumed by the ratepayer. In structuring such a system, the analogy to the
treatment of sanitary sewer rates, where water delivery is used as an approximation of
the amount of wastewater the sewer customer discharges into the sewer system, might be
useful. A storm water flat rate for being connected to the water delivery system might be
imposed. The storm water fee could be tied to water use, not property ownership. This
approach would be useful where the water contributed to the storm water system or
runoff was connected to delivered water.
An alternate approach might be to base the fee structure on the amount of storm water
runoff beyond that which would be contributed to the MS4 had the property been left in its
natural state. The advantage of this approach is that it stresses the election to voluntarily
use the service. While arguable as a matter of theory, it should be appreciated that Salinas
rejected using impervious area, which is similar in approach, as a proxy for use.
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In addition to technical and economic difficulties, practical constraints
also exist. Storm water is inherently diffuse and sporadic in nature.
Both the volume and the velocity of the discharge depend on weather
conditions. Urbanization complicates the problem because the capacity
of the soil to absorb precipitation depends on factors directly related to
urbanization. Urban development generally increases the amount of
pollution in the runoff and decreases the opportunity for natural
processes to reduce pollutant loads due to the increase of impervious
surfaces. These considerations make tracing storm water pollution to
specific sources difficult, which further complicates the task of
controlling it through regulation. Creative approaches to effectively
addressing the problems are needed.
Finally, the problem of storm water regulation has been hampered, at
least until recently, by regulatory inertia. Several years ago, a
commentator captured the problem of regulatory inertia when he
observed: “Separate storm sewers are technically subject to the NPDES
program [the Clean Water Act] but can be covered by general permits.
For the most part, this means a free ride, with the burden on the
regulators to revise the status quo.”175
In California, regulatory inertia started to change in the early 1990s
when regional water quality control boards began issuing the first round
municipal storm water permits under the authority of the CWA.
Progress accelerated with the turn of the millennia. Since then,
California has continued its leadership role in changing the status quo.
The San Diego MS4 permit is at the forefront of California’s regulatory
effort. Thus, it is a useful vehicle to study some of the important legal
issues associated with the regulation of the waste in storm water.
The significance of the storm water problem to society is clear. It is
the leading cause of water quality both nationally and in California.
Consequently, it should not be surprising that the era of timorous or lax
regulation of urban runoff has passed. But its passing has not occurred
without legal and political controversy that is likely to continue for the
foreseeable future.

175. STENSVAAG, supra note 10, at 638 (quoting WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 2
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.31 (1986)).
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